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I. Introduction
On January 1, 1999, the euro officially became the common currency for
11 countries of continental Europe, and a single monetary policy started
under the authority of the European Central Bank (ECB).
1 The European
Monetary Union
2 (EMU) followed decades of monetary policies set by
national central banks to serve domestic interests, even though these na-
tional policies were constrained by monetary arrangements such as the
European Monetary System (EMS), which was designed to limit ex-
change rate fluctuations. Approaching the tenth anniversary of the
EMU, we begin to have sufficient data to potentially observe effects of
the monetary union on business cycle dynamics.
This paper has three objectives. The first is to characterize the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the euro area (EA)
and across its constituent countries. The second is to document how
this transmission might have changed since the creation of the euro.
The third objective consists of providing a set of explanations, based
on a structural open‐economy model, for the observed differences
over time and across countries in the responses of key macroeconomic
variables.
Ourfirsttwoobjectivesrequireanempiricalmodelthatcapturesempiri-
cally the EA‐wide macroeconomic dynamics, while allowing us to esti-
mate the potentially heterogeneous transmission of EA shocks within
individual countries. The factor‐augmented vector autogression (FAVAR)
modelproposedbyBernanke,Boivin,andEliasz(2005)isanaturalframe-
work in this context. By pooling together a large set of macroeconomic
indicators from individual countries, it allows us to identify areawide
factors, quantify their importance in the country‐level fluctuations, and
trace out the effect of identified aggregate shocks on all country‐level
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countries and the EA.
Many papershaveattemptedtocharacterizethedynamics of European
economies. One common strategy has been to model the EA economy
using only EA aggregates. Examples include evidence based on VARs
(Peersman and Smets 2003), more structural models (the ECB area‐wide
model [AWM]; Fagan, Henry, and Mestre 2005), and optimization‐based
macroeconomic models (Smets and Wouters 2003; Christiano, Motto,
and Rostagno 2007; Coenen, McAdam, and Straub, forthcoming [the
new AWM]). Alternatively, authors have estimated models using country‐
level data either to analyze the effects of various macroeconomic shocks
or for forecasting, using models of national central banks (Fagan and
Morgan 2006) or VARs (e.g., Mihov 2001; Mojon and Peersman 2003).
An important feature of the FAVAR is that it allows us to model
jointly the dynamics of EA‐wide variables and country‐level variables
within a single consistent empirical framework. In that respect, we see
our empirical strategy as an improvement over the numerous papers
that have compared impulse responses to shocks on the basis of models
estimated separately for each country (e.g., Angeloni, Kashyap, and
Mojon 2003, chaps. 3, 5). The estimated model suggests that a significant
fraction of country‐level variables such as the components of output and
prices, employment, productivity, and asset prices can be explained by
EA‐wide common factors.
In order to characterize the monetary transmission mechanism, we
identify unexpected monetary policy shocks and estimate their dynamic
effects on the national macroeconomic variables. We are particularly in-
terested in documenting differences over time and across countries in
the sensitivity of national economies to such shocks. (In the appendix
to the working paper version of this paper [Boivin, Giannoni, and Mojon
2008], we also document the effects of identified oil price shocks.) It is
important to note that it is not because we believe that monetary policy
shocks constitute an important source of business cycle fluctuations that
we are interested in documenting the effects of such shocks. In fact,
much of the empirical literature finds that monetary shocks contribute
relatively little to business cycle fluctuations (e.g., Sims and Zha 2006).
Instead, monetary policy affects importantly the economy through its
systematic reaction to economic conditions. The impulse response func-
tions to monetary policy shocks provide a useful description of the ef-
fects of a systematic monetary policy rule by tracing out the responses of
various macroeconomic variables following a surprise interest rate
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to that particular policy rule.
The estimated monetary transmission mechanism is largely consistent
with conventional wisdom. A monetary policy tightening in the EA as a
whole or in Germany triggers an appreciation of the exchange rate and a
downwardadjustmentofdemandandeventuallyofprices.Fortheperiod
preceding the EMU, we find considerable heterogeneity in the trans-
mission of these shocks across countries. In particular, we find larger re-
sponses of long‐term interest rates in Italy and in Spain, which contribute
to largercontractions of consumption in these two countries.Also, restric-
tive monetary policy in the EA tended to trigger a depreciation of the lira
and the peseta and a smaller decline of exports of these countries than in
the rest of the EA.
The creation of the euro has contributed to a widespread reduction in
the effect of monetary shocks. In particular, long‐term interest rates, as
well as consumption, investment, output, and employment, respond
lesstoshort‐terminterestrateshocksinthenewmonetarypolicyregime,
whereas trade and the effective real exchange rate respond more
strongly.While the monetary transmission mechanism has become more
homogeneous along the yield curve, some striking asymmetries persist,
for instance, in the response of national monetary aggregates to common
interest rate shocks, suggesting pervasive differences in national savings
practices.
We use a structural open‐economy model to explore some potential
explanations for this evolution of the transmission mechanism of mone-
tary policy. More precisely, we extend the model of Ferrero, Gertler, and
Svensson (forthcoming) with, among other things, a risk premium on
intra‐area exchange rates for the period prior to the EMU. This devia-
tion from the uncovered interest rate parity is necessary to replicate a
larger response of Italian and Spanish interest rates to German mone-
tary shocks. Using a calibrated version of this model, we show that the
combination of two ingredients can replicate the evolution of the esti-
mated transmission mechanism since the start of the EMU: the elimina-
tion of the exchange rate premium that plagued some of the European
countries by fixing the intra‐area exchange rates and a shift in monetary
policy, mainlytoward a more aggressive responsetoinflationandoutput.
Thislatterfindingsuggeststhatthechangeinthetransmissionmechanism
comes not only from the adoption of a single currency but also from the
ECB policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the
econometric framework. It discusses the formulation and estimation of
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discuss the empirical implementation, describing the data used in our
estimation, our preferred specification of the FAVAR, and its basic em-
pirical properties. Section IV studies the effects of monetary shocks in
the EA and in individual countries and discusses their changes since the
creation of the EMU in 1999. Section V attempts to explain the cross‐
country differences as well as the changes over time in the monetary
transmission mechanism. Section VI presents conclusions.
II. Econometric Framework
We are interested in modeling empirically the EA‐wide macroeconomic
dynamics, while allowing heterogeneity in the transmission of EA
shocks within individual countries. A natural framework to achieve
this goal is the FAVAR model described in Bernanke et al. (2005). The
model is estimated using indicators from individual European econo-
mies as well as from the EA. The general idea behind our implementa-
tion is to decompose the fluctuations in individual series into a
component driven by common European fluctuations and a component
that is specific to the particular series considered. EA‐wide common
shocks can then be identified from the multidimensional common com-
ponents. The FAVAR also allows us to characterize the response of all
data series to macroeconomic disturbances, such as monetary policy
shocks or oil price shocks. Importantly, by modeling jointly EA and
country‐level dynamics, this framework allows each country’s sensitiv-
ity to EA shocks to be different.
A. Description of the FAV AR Model
We provide here only a general description of our implementation of
the empirical framework and refer the interested reader to Bernanke
et al. (2005) for additional details. We assume that the economy is af-
fected by a vector Ct of common EA‐wide components to all variables
entering the data set. Since we will be interested in characterizing the
effects of monetary policy, this vector of common components includes
a short‐term interest rate, Rt, to measure the stance of monetary policy.
Our specification also includes the growth rate of an oil price index, πoil
t ,
as an observable factor. Both of these variables are allowed to have a
pervasive effect throughout the economy and will thus be considered
as common components of all variables entering the data set. The rest
of the common dynamics is captured by a K   1 vector of unobserved
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reflect general economic conditions such as “economic activity,” the
“general level of prices,” and the level of “productivity,” which may
not easily be captured by a few time series, but rather by a wide range
of economic variables.
3 We assume that the joint dynamics of πoil
t , Ft,
and Rt are given by











and ΦðLÞ is a conformable lag polynomial of finite order that may con-
tain a priori restrictions, as in standard structural VARs. The error term
vt is independently and identically distributed with mean zero and co-
variance matrix Q.
The system (1) is a VAR in Ct. The additional difficulty, with respect
to standard VARs, however, is that the factors Ft are unobservable. We
assume that the factors summarize the information contained in a large
number of economic variables. We denote by Xt this N   1v e c t o ro f
“informational” variables, where N is assumed to be “large,” that is,
N > K þ 2. We assume furthermore that the large set of observable “in-
formational” series Xt is related to the common factors according to
Xt ¼ ΛCt þ et; ð2Þ
whereΛisanN  ð K þ 2Þmatrixoffactor loadings,andtheN   1vector
et contains (mean zero) series‐specific components that are uncorrelated
with the common components Ct. These series‐specific components are
allowed tobeseriallycorrelatedand weaklycorrelated acrossindicators.
Equation (2) reflects the fact that the elements of Ct, which in general are
correlated, represent pervasive forces that drive the common dynamics
of Xt. Conditional on the observed short‐term interest rate Rt, the vari-
ables in Xt are thus noisy measures of the underlying unobserved factors
Ft. Note that it is in principle not restrictive to assume that Xt depends
only on the current values of the factors, since Ft can always capture ar-
bitrary lags of some fundamental factors.
4
Theempiricalmodel(1)and(2)providesaconvenientdecompositionof
all data series into components driven by the EA factors Ct (i.e., the short‐
term interest rate, oil prices, and other latent dimensions of aggregate
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ponents unrelated to the general state of the economies, et. For instance,
(2) specifies that indicators of country‐level economic activity or infla-
tion are driven by a European interest rate, EA latent factors Ft, and a
component that is specific to each individual series (representing, e.g.,
measurement error or other idiosyncrasies of each series). The dynamics
of the EA common components are in turn specified by (1).
As in Bernanke et al. (2005), we estimate our empirical model using a
variant of a two‐step principal component approach. In the first step,
we extract principal components from the large data set Xt to obtain
consistent estimates of the common factors.
5 Stock and Watson (2002)
and Bai and Ng (2006) show that the principal components consistently
recover the space spanned by the factors when N is large and the num-
ber of principal components used is at least as large as the true number
of factors. In the second step, we add the oil price inflation and the
short‐term interest rate to the estimated factors and estimate the struc-
tural VAR (1). Our implementation differs slightly from that of Bernanke
et al. since we impose the constraint that the observed factors (πoil
t and
Rt) are among the factors in the first‐step estimation.
6 This guarantees
that the estimated latent factors recover dimensions of the common dy-
namics not captured by the observed factors.
7
This procedure has the advantages of being computationally simple
and easy to implement. As discussed by Stock and Watson (2002), it also
imposes few distributional assumptions and allows for some degree of
cross‐correlation in the idiosyncratic error term et. Boivin and Ng (2005)
document the good forecasting performance of this estimation approach
compared to some alternatives.
8
B. Interpreting the FAV AR Structure
Various approaches have been used in the literature to model macro-
economic dynamics in the EA. As we illustrate in this subsection, these
approaches can be interpreted as special cases of the FAVAR frame-
work. Our approach thus merges some of the strengths of these existing
approaches and allows us to answer a broader set of questions.
As in Bernanke et al. (2005) and in Boivin and Giannoni (2006a), we
interpret the common component Ct as corresponding to the vector of
theoretical concepts or variables that would enter a structural macro-
economic model of the EA. For instance, the structural open‐economy
model that we consider in Section V.A fully characterizes the equi-
librium evolution of inflation, output, interest rates, net exports, and
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framework, all these variables would either be included in Ct or be lin-
ear combinations of the elements of Ct. The dynamic evolution of these
variables can be approximated by a VAR of the form (1).
9
The existing approaches that model the dynamics of EAvariables can
be interpreted as special cases of the FAVAR model, in the case in which
the elements of Ct are perfectly observed, so that the system (1)–(2) boils
down to a VAR. Interpreted in this way, the various existing empirical
models differ about the assumptions they make about the variables in-
cluded in Ct, the indicators used to measure Ct, and the restrictions im-
posed on the coefficients of (1)–(2).
One approach is to assume that the elements of Ct are observed and
correspond to EA aggregates.
10 Such a model can be estimated directly
using a VAR on EA aggregates only (e.g., Peersman and Smets 2003) or
a constrained version of a VAR corresponding, for example, to the ECB
AWM (Fagan et al. 2005) or even optimization‐based macroeconomic
models (Smets and Wouters 2003; Christiano et al. 2007; Coenen et al.,
forthcoming [the new AWM]). Models estimated only on EA aggregates
are silent about the regional effects of a shock.
A second approach is to assume that the elements of Ct are observed
and correspond to variables of different regions. In that case, the FAVAR
boils down to multicountry VARs and could be estimated directly, as in,
for example, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Scholl and Uhlig (2008).
A third approach is to assume that elements of Ct are observed and
correspond to variables of a specific country. A large literature has in
fact analyzed the cross‐country differences in the response of monetary
policy using country‐level models that are estimated separately (see
Guiso et al. [1999], Mojon and Peersman [2003], Ciccarelli and Rebucci
[2006], and references therein). By construction these models focus on
country‐specific shocks and do not explicitly identify the effects of
EA‐wide shocks such as changes in the stance of monetary policy that
would affect all countries simultaneously. The transmission of such
shocks could potentially be amplified through trade and expectation
spillovers.
11
Importantly, in all these cases, since the variables necessary to capture
the EA dynamics are observed, there is no need to use the large set of in-
dicators Xt. However, there are reasons to believe that some relevant
macroeconomic concepts are imperfectly observed. First, some concepts
are simply measured with error.
12 Second, some of the macroeconomic
variables that are key for the model’s dynamics may be fundamentally
latent. For instance, the concept of “potential output” often critical in
Monetary Transmission Mechanism 83monetary models cannot be measured directly. By using a large data set,
oneisabletoextractempiricallythecomponentsthataremostimportant
inexplainingfluctuationsintheentiredataset.Whileeachcommoncom-
ponent doesnot needto represent anysingleeconomicconcept, thecom-




An advantage of this empirical framework is that it provides sum-
mary measures of the state of these economies at each date, in the form
of factors that may summarize many features of the economy. We thus
do not restrict ourselves to summarizing the state of the economies with
particular measures of inflation and of output. Another advantage, as
Bernanke et al. argue, is that this framework should lead to a better
identification of the monetary policy shock than standard VARs, be-
cause it explicitly recognizes the large information set that the central
bank and financial market participants exploit in practice and also be-
cause, as just argued, it does not require one to take a stand on the ap-
propriate measures of prices and real activity that can simply be treated
as latent common components. Moreover, for a set of identifying as-
sumptions, a natural by‐product of the estimation is to provide impulse
response functions for any variable included in the data set. This is par-
ticularly useful in our case since we want to understand the effects of
macroeconomic shocks on a wide range of economic variables across
EA countries.
Other papers have in fact followed a similar route. Sala (2001) esti-
mates the effects of German and EA composite interest rate shocks
using a factor model. He stresses large asymmetries in the response
of either output or prices to this shock. Favero, Marcellino, and Neglia
(2005) compare the effects of monetary policy shocks on output and in-
flation in Germany, France, Italy, and Spain for alternative specifica-
tions of factor models. They find largely homogeneous effects on
output gaps and inflation rates across countries. Eickmeier (2006) and
Eickmeier and Breitung (2006)characterize theeffectsof commonshocks
on GDP and inflation in 12 countries of the EA and in new European
Union members that will adopt the euro in the future. They conclude
that these common shocks transmit rather homogeneously across coun-
tries so that the remaining heterogeneity across EA countries seems to
originate in idiosyncratic shocks.
In contrast, in this paper we seek to better understand the role of the
monetary policy regime in explaining different monetary transmissions
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the EA, and their move toward a common currency, provide a unique
experiment for monetary economists. For this reason our focus is not
strictly on the response of countries’ GDPs and inflation rates, but on
many relevant dimensions of the economy. We thus seek to take full
advantage of the FAVAR structure to document the effect of various
shocks on various measures of real activity, such as GDP and its com-
ponents, employment and unemployment, various inflation measures,
and financial variables. Although our scope is broader, our approach is
similar to that used by McCallum and Smets (2007), who use a similar
FAVAR to study how the responses of wages and employment to mone-




The data set used in the estimation of our FAVAR is a balanced panel
of 245 quarterly series, for the period running from 1980:1 to 2007:3.
We limited the sample to the six largest economies of the EA, that is,
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium, for which
we could gather a balanced panel of 33 economic quarterly time series
that are available back to 1980. Given that these countries account for
90% of the EA population and output, we deem it unlikely that the in-
clusion of other EA countries would alter our estimates of EA business
cycle characteristics.
The 33 economic variables that we gathered for each country and the
EA include two interest rates, M1, M3, the effective exchange rate, an
index of stock prices, GDP, and its decomposition by expenditure, the
associated deflators, producer price index and consumer price index
(CPI), the unemployment rate, employment, hourly earnings, unit labor
cost measures, capacity utilization, retail sales, and number of cars sold.
In addition to these 231 country‐level and EA‐level variables, we also
include an interest rate and real GDP for the United Kingdom, the
United States, and Japan; the euro/dollar exchange rate; an index of
commodity prices; and the price of oil. The database was mostly ex-
tracted from Haver Analytics. In a number of cases the Haver data were
backdated using older vintages of OECD databases. The definitions of
the variables, the source, and details about the data construction are
Monetary Transmission Mechanism 85given in the appendix. The graphs of the data are available in the ap-
pendix of the worker paper version of this paper.
We take year‐on‐year (yoy) growth rates of all time series except for
interest rates, unemployment rates, and capacity utilization rates. The
yoy transformation is preferred to limit risks of noise due to improper
or lack of seasonal adjustment in the data.
B. Sample Period
The choice of the sample period is delicate. On the one hand, our inter-
est lies in characterizing the monetary transmission in the period since
the start of the monetary union in January 1999. We therefore have
about nine years of data that correspond to the strict monetary union.
However, the objective of stabilizing exchange rates within what would
become the EA started much earlier. In fact, already in the 1970s, Euro-
pean governments set up mechanisms that aimed at limiting exchange
rate fluctuations within Europe.
13 The march to the monetary union has
been gradual, and each country has progressed at its own speed. The
pegs of Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands to the deutsche mark
were not realigned after the early 1980s. The last realignment of the
French franc to core EMS currencies (the deutsche mark, the Belgian
franc, and the Dutch guilder) took place in January 1987. Ex post, we
know that the parity between the French franc, the Belgian franc, the
Dutch guilder, and the deutsche mark hardly changed at all since
January 1987. However, a significant risk premium for fear of realign-
ment plagued the French currency until 1995. Finally, countries such as
Italy and Spain—as well as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Finland,
which are not in our sample—saw their currencies fluctuate vis‐à‐vis
their future partners in the monetary union well into the 1990s.
Although interest rates remained much higher in Italy and Spain than
in Germany up until the mid‐1990s because of risk premia, changes in
the interest rates set by the Bundesbank would be echoed in domestic
monetary conditions because of the official peg to the deutsche mark.
Another key aspect of the process of monetary integration is the de-
gree of nominal convergence. Inflation rates were much further apart in
the 1970s and early 1980s than ever since.
For all these considerations and to avoid capturing the large changes
on nominal variables that have occurred in the early 1980s, we propose
to describe the effects of standard common shocks starting in 1988. We
will also contrast the results with estimates for a sample corresponding
to the strict monetary union regime starting in 1999.
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For the model selection, the short sample size severely constrains the
class of specifications we can consider, especially the number of lags
in (1), as well as the number of latent factors. We were thus forced to
consider models with no more than eight factors and three lags. Among
those, our approach has been to search for the most parsimonious model
for which the key conclusions that we emphasize below are robust to the
inclusion of additional factors and lags. On the basis of this, our pre-
ferred specification is one with a vector of common components Ct con-
taining five latent factors in addition to the short‐term interest rate and
oil price inflation and a VAR equation (1) with one lag. As we show be-
low, these common factors explain a meaningful fraction of the variance
of country‐level variables.
D. European Factors and EA Countries’ Dynamics
To assess whether our FAVAR model provides a reasonable character-
ization of the individual series, we now determine the importance of
area‐wide fluctuations for individual countries. Note that from equa-
tion (2), each of the variables Xit of our panel can be decomposed into
a component λ′ iCt that characterizes the effects of EA‐wide fluctuations
and a component eit that is specific to the series considered:
Xit ¼ λ′ iCt þ eit: ð3Þ
It is important to note that each variable may be affected very differ-
ently by the multidimensional vector Ct summarizing EA‐wide fluctua-
tions, since the estimated vectors of loadings λi may take arbitrary
values. We first start by determining the extent to which key European
variables are correlated with EA factors over three samples. We then dis-
cuss how the importance of these factors has changed over time. In the
next section, we document how monetary shocks get transmitted to the
EA and across the different countries.
Several studies have recently attempted to determine the degree of
comovement of a few macroeconomic series across countries.
14 Forni
et al. (2000) and Favero et al. (2005) show that a small number of factors
provide an efficient information summary of the main economic time
series both at the EA level and for the four largest countries of the EA.
Eickmeier (2006) and Eickmeier and Breitung (2006) confirm these re-
sults but also stress that country‐level inflation and output fluctuations
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EA counterparts. However, Agresti and Mojon (2003) show that the
comovement of either consumption or investment across EA countries
is smaller than the comovement of GDP. Hence there is a possibility that
the tightness of economic variables with the EA business cycle may be
uneven across countries and across variables of different kinds. This is
why we consider a large number of economic variables rather than a
couple of macroeconomic indicators in our analysis.
E. Comovements between European Variables and EA Factors
Table 1 reports the fraction of the volatility in the series listed in the
table that is explained by the seven EA‐wide factors Ct (i.e., five latent
factors, the log change of the oil price, and the EA short‐term interest
rate). This corresponds to the R2 statistics obtained by the regressions of
these variables on the appropriate set of factors.
Columns 1–3 report the R2 statistics obtained by regressing the re-
spective EA‐wide series on the common factors for our entire sample,
a subsample representing the period preceding the monetary union,
and the sample starting in 1999 representing the period in which the
EMU is in place. These numbers indicate that most of the variables
listed are strongly correlated with the common factors, both before
and after the monetary union.
15 While the short‐term interest rate is a
c o m m o nf a c t o rb ya s s u m p t i o n ,o t h e rk e yv a r i a b l e ss u c ha sE Ar e a l
GDP growth, CPI inflation, bond yields, and the unemployment rate
all have R2 statistics above 0.9. The common factors therefore summa-
rize quite well the information contained in these EA series. Not all se-
ries, however, are as strongly correlated with the common factors. For
instance, the growth rate of the monetary aggregate M1 and public con-
sumption for the EA, with R2 statistics of only 0.43 and 0.54, display
much less comovement with the common factors.
Instead of estimating latent factors from our large data set, we could
alternatively impose key EA macroeconomic variables such as GDP,
consumption, inflation, exchange rate, bond yield, and unemployment
as observed factors. Our proposed approach dominates, however, since
the latent factors explain a substantially larger share of the variance of
our sample than intuitive combinations of EA aggregates. The addi-
tional explanatory power of the latent factors amounts on average to
10% of the variables’ variance.
Columns 4–6 of table 1 report the average across countries of the R2
statistics for the relevant variables. The R2 statistics are overall lower
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country has country‐specific features that are not summarized by the
common factors Ct a n dt h a tt e n dt oa v e r a g eo u tw h e nc o n s i d e r i n g
the EA as a whole. Nonetheless, the table shows that, on average, over
the six European countries, most of the variables are also strongly cor-
related with the common factors. Again, for the entire sample, country‐
level measures of GDP growth, short and long interest rates, inflation,
employment, and unemployment all show, on average, high degrees of
comovement with the common factors, whereasgrowthrates of M1, M2,
and public consumption show much lower degrees of comovement.
One might think that the relatively low R2 statistics for M1 and M3
reflect the fact that our panel includes a relatively small number of series
of monetary aggregates. This intuition is, however, incorrect. If mone-
tary aggregates constituted an important source of fluctuations for a
Table 1
R 2 for Regressions of Selected Series on Common Factors



















Short‐term interest rate 1.00 1.00 1.00 .97 .97 1.00
Bond yield .96 .96 .95 .94 .94 .95
Stock price .65 .71 .91 .61 .77 .88
Real exchange rate .78 .82 .93 .73 .79 .93
M1 .43 .65 .73 .42 .65 .53
M3 .70 .92 .74 .50 .71 .69
Deflator GDP .88 .89 .88 .73 .81 .84
Deflator personal
consumptionexpenditure .88 .90 .72 .77 .90 .83
Deflator investment .89 .93 .88 .63 .71 .75
Deflator exports .86 .80 .97 .72 .71 .94
Deflator imports .93 .89 .99 .82 .78 .97
CPI .94 .97 .90 .78 .91 .83
Real GDP .94 .97 .96 .79 .84 .90
Consumption .88 .92 .90 .71 .75 .81
Public consumption .54 .71 .54 .42 .59 .63
Investment .92 .93 .94 .65 .76 .78
Exports .70 .71 .93 .67 .68 .88
Imports .84 .95 .93 .74 .81 .89
Employment .85 .90 .97 .78 .85 .85
Unemployment rate .92 .97 .96 .86 .93 .96
Hourly earnings .94 .97 .69 .79 .92 .74
Unit labor costs .89 .96 .88 .81 .92 .89
Capacity utilization ratio .86 .92 .95 .67 .80 .77
Retail .73 .80 .60 .53 .67 .60
Monetary Transmission Mechanism 89wide range of variables in our panel, then the R2 for the monetary aggre-
gate series should be high even if no such series was used for the estima-
tion of the latent factors. In this case, the estimated latent factors should
be capturing the common movements in the data that are generated by
fluctuations in the monetary aggregates. So in theory, provided that we
allow for a sufficiently large number of latent factors, the composition of
the panel should not matter for the estimation of latent factors.
Looking across countries reveals that the correlation with the com-
mon factors is broadly similar across countries in each of the subsam-
ples. Table 2 reports the average R2 statistic for each country across the
variables listed in table 1. It shows that country‐level R2’s vary between
0.64 and 0.77 for the entire sample, between 0.74 and 0.84 in the first
subsample, and between 0.78 and 0.87 in the post‐EMU sample.
Table 2 also shows that in the case of Germany, the Netherlands, and
Belgium, the R2’s are sensibly lower for the entire sample than for each
of the subsamples considered. This suggests that the relationship be-
tween the variables in those countries and the common factors must
have changed between the pre‐1999 and post‐1999 periods. Finally,
we observe that Italian and Spanish variables have become somewhat
less tied to EA‐wide developments over time. This comes essentially
from the growth rates of real variables. This is particularly clear for
Spain, since its GDP has grown at a faster pace than that of the rest of
the EA since 1995, but is less clear‐cut for Italy, which has grown slightly
less rapidly than the rest of the EA.
IV. Monetary Policy Regimes and the Monetary
Transmission Mechanism
In the last section, we have documented that the variables of each in-
dividual country have been on average fairly highly correlated with the
Table 2







Euro area .83 .88 .87
Germany .69 .77 .82
France .76 .84 .87
Italy .73 .82 .79
Spain .76 .84 .78
Netherlands .64 .74 .86
Belgium .68 .79 .84
Boivin, Giannoni, and Mojon 90EA‐wide common factors. Nonetheless, aggregate shocks affecting the
entire EA may have different implications for each individual country.
To assess this, we use our estimated FAVAR to characterize the effects of
monetary policy shocks, which we measure here as an unanticipated
increase in the EA short‐term interest rate of 100 basis points on the
national economies considered. Our empirical model is well suited
for this since it allows us to determine simultaneously the effects of
such shocks on all country‐level variables.
As mentioned above, the data reveal changes over time in the degree
of comovement of key European variables with EA‐wide common fac-
tors. A natural implication of such changes is that the transmission of
monetary policy may have evolved over time. We thus report the effects
of monetary policy shocks both for our benchmark sample and for the
post‐EMU period. The description of the effects of this shock is a natural
starting point in a context in which several countries have chosen to
adopt a common currency and therefore to submit their economy to a
single monetary policy.
A. Identification
To identify monetary policy shocks, we proceed similarly to Bernanke
et al. (2005) by assuming in the spirit of VAR analyses that the latent
factors Ft and the oil price inflation πoil
t cannot respond contempora-
neously to a surprise interest rate change, whereas the short‐term rate
Rt can respond to any innovation in the factors Ft or in oil prices. Of
course, we do not restrict in any way the response of factors Ft and
πoil
t in the periods following the monetary shock. This constitutes a
minimal set of restrictions needed to identify monetary policy shocks.
We also impose that all prices and quantity series respond to monetary
policy only through its lagged effect on Ft (and potentially πoil
t ). This
guarantees that none of these variables responds contemporaneously
to unexpected monetary shocks, as is often assumed. These restrictions
do not, however, prevent any of the financial variables such as bond
yields, stock prices, and exchange rates from responding contempora-
neously to the short‐term interest rate.
In the next section, we present a theoretical model that is designed to
provide some explanations for the monetary transmission mechanism.
We note at this point that this model is consistent with the identifying
assumptions made here. In particular, both the theoretical model and
the FAVAR have the property that output, consumption, and inflation
do not respond contemporaneously to monetary shocks.
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term EA interest rate is certainly appropriate for the post‐EMU period
during which the ECB has set the short‐term EA interest rate. It may be
less appropriate, however, for the pre‐EMU period, during which each
national central bank could in principle choose its own interest rate. As
in Peersman and Smets (2003), Smets and Wouters (2003), and many
others, during the pre‐EMU period, our monetary policy shock is a ficti-




participating in the EMS. Given the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in
place, which limited fluctuations in nominal exchange rates, most of the
other national central banks had to respond to changes in interest rates
by the Bundesbank. For this reason, we verified the robustness of our re-
sults forthe pre‐EMU period by identifying amonetary policy shock asa
surprise increase in the German short‐term interest rate. The results ob-
tained are briefly described in Section IV.E, which discusses the robust-
nessofourresults,andarereportedintheappendixoftheworkingpaper
version of this paper.
B. Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks in the Euro Area
in the 1988–2007 Period
Figures 1a–1c report the estimated impulse responses to an unexpected
100 basis point increase in the EA short‐term interest rate. While the
dark solid lines plot the responses of the variables in each country for
the full sample of 1988–2007 along with the 90% confidence intervals
(dottedlines),thedashedlinesplottheresponsesforthepost‐EMUperiod
starting in 1999. The figures plot in a column the responses of a particular
variable.Thefirstfiveplotsineachcolumnshowtheimpulseresponsesin
the EA, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. The bottom two plots combine
theresponsesforallcountriesinthetwodifferentsamples.Theyrevealthe
differences across regions in each sample.
We first start by describing the response of the EA economy in the
1988–2007 period by focusing on the plots in the first row. These plots
show that faced with an unanticipated monetary tightening of 100 basis
points, bond yields overall increase on impact by even more than 100
basis points, the EA real exchange rate appreciates by about 2% in the
quarter of the shock and is expected to continue appreciating for more
than 2 years, and the growth rate of the monetary aggregate M3 falls.
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and does not revert to a positive value before 3 years. Our point esti-
mate of the impact of monetary policy on output tends to be larger than
in Smets and Wouters (2003) and various estimates reported in Angeloni
et al. (2003). The large drop in output reflects a broad‐based decline in
aggregate consumption, investment, and exports.
16 The decline in over-
all economic activity is furthermore clearly reflected in a fall in employ-
ment reaching about 0.7% after 6 quarters and a subsequent increase in
the unemployment rate. It is followed by a reduction in hourly earnings
and in CPI inflation.
C. Cross‐Country Differences in the 1988–2007 Period
The transmission of monetary policy disturbances on the EA just de-
scribed, however, hides heterogeneity across the countries’ responses.
Looking at the other panels, we observe in figure 1a that a surprise in-
crease in the EA short‐term interest rate results in much larger interest
rate increases in countries such as Italy and Spain than in the other
Fig. 1a. Impulse response functions to a monetary tightening in EA (shock equals 100
basis point increase in short‐term rate; responses are expressed in year‐over‐year growth
rates except for interest rates).
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17 This heterogeneity gets amplified when looking at long‐
term yields. In fact, the Italian and Spanish bond yields rise almost
twice as much as the yields of some other countries such as Germany,
France, or the Netherlands.
Consistent with the larger rise in bond yields in Italy and Spain over
the whole sample and with the interest rate parity condition, the Italian
and Spanish currencies depreciate with respect to the other countries’
currencies in the pre‐EMU period. The Italian and Spanish real effective
exchange rates depreciate on impact and in subsequent quarters,
whereas the price levels remain unchanged in the period of the shock
(figs. 1a and 1c).
18 Instead, all the other countries see their real exchange
rates appreciate on impact and for several quarters after the shock, in
response to the monetary tightening.
Following the increase in interest rates and the movements of the ex-
change rate, we observe a decline in the growth rate of GDP. While the
GDP responses appear rather homogeneous across countries, the re-
sponses of GDP components are not. Importantly, consumption falls
by about twice as much in Italy and Spain as in the other countries,
Fig. 1b. Impulse response functions to a monetary tightening in EA (shock equals 100
basis point increase in short‐term rate; responses are expressed in year‐over‐year growth
rates).
Boivin, Giannoni, and Mojon 94and investment also falls more. The depreciation of the Italian and
Spanish real exchange rates, however, mitigates the fall in exports, thus
contributing to a more homogeneous output response. These figures
thus clearly reveal how diverse responses of bond yields and exchange
rates affect differently the various European economies when we con-
sider economic adjustments in the pre‐EMU period.
We note that the responses of CPI inflation reveal a temporary “price
puzzle” in Germany and Italy following a tightening of the artificial EA
interest rate. While the price increases may be explained in Italy by the
exchange rate depreciation—a feature that the model we present below
is able to replicate—the price increase in Germany is more difficult to
rationalize. One possibility is that the artificial EA interest rate may not
properly capture surprise monetary shocks for Germany. In fact, when
we identify monetary shocks as surprise increases in the German inter-
est rate, for the sample starting in 1988, we obtain almost no price puz-
zle for Germany (see the figures in the appendix of the working paper
version). It is reassuring, however, that all other responses appear to be
Fig. 1c. Impulse response functions to a monetary tightening in EA (shock equals 100
basis point increase in short‐term rate; responses are expressed in year‐over‐year growth
rates).
Monetary Transmission Mechanism 95very similar to the ones reported in our benchmark specification in
figures 1a–1c.
Finally, it should be stressed that the effects of interest rate shocks on
M3 (as well as on M1) are quite different across countries. We have seen
in Section III.E that the monetary aggregates are markedly more loosely
related to the common factors than most other variables under consid-
eration. This may reflect the pervasive differences in the national habits
and in the availability of savings instruments across countries of the
EA. The ECB (2007) report on financial integration points to, among
other things, the large differences in financial assets of household sec-
tors across countries (from four times annual consumption in Belgium
and Italy to only twice in France and Germany), large differences in the
composition of financial wealth, and different pass‐through of the mar-
ket interest rate to deposit interest rates (see Kok Sørensen and Werner
[2006] and references therein).
As we noted, the responses that we have documented reveal much
larger increases in interest rates and sharper drops in consumption in
Italy and Spain than in the other EA countries. Italy, for instance, was
subject to considerable speculative attacks in the early 1990s. That
forced the Bank of Italy to increase short‐term rates considerably more
than, for example, in Germany, in order to defend its currency—thereby
leading to a more important contraction of economic activity—until it
had to abandon the ERM in September 1992. One might thus wonder
whether the effects that we uncovered are due to this unusual event
that was the crisis of the ERM. To investigate this question, we reesti-
mated the impulse response functions for the entire sample, except that
we excluded the observations from the third quarter of 1992 to the sec-
ond quarter of 1993. We find that the responses of short‐ and long‐term
interest rates are almost identical to the one reported in figure 1a. The
only notable difference is that the response of consumption is slightly
smaller in all countries, but we still observe a much larger contraction
of consumption in Italy and Spain than in the other EA countries. So the
facts that we have documented do not appear to be simply an artifact of
a few observations around the ERM crisis.
D. Has the Transmission Changed with the EMU?
To determine whether the monetary transmission has changed since the
start of the EMU, we reestimate the effects of a monetary policy shock
using the 37 quarterly observations that correspond to the post‐1999
period corresponding to the EMU. The scarcity of degrees of freedom
Boivin, Giannoni, and Mojon 96implies that we should be extremely cautious in interpreting the results.
We nevertheless trust that the estimates provide an indication on the
direction of evolution of the effects of monetary policy with respect
to the full‐sample estimates.
Several results are worth emphasizing for the post‐1999 period, again
in the face of a 100 basis point increase in the short‐term interest rate.
First, the short‐term interest rate responses are indistinguishable for all
countries, given that they refer to the same currency. Second, the rise in
bond yields in the EMU period is almost half of the one estimated for
the entire sample, and the large differences across countries that were
observable prior to the EMU vanish entirely. The EA effective exchange
rate appreciates considerably more than it did over the full sample. One
reason for this is that real exchange rates uniformly appreciate in EA
countries, including Italy and Spain.
19
Given the relatively small change in bond yields, measures of eco-
nomic activity such as real GDP, consumption, and investment fall much
less, if at all, in the EMU period. As a result, employment falls much less,
and the unemployment rate’s increase is sensibly smaller.
Altogether, it appears that a major characteristic of the new monetary
policy regime is the lack of response of long‐term interest rates to sur-
prise increases in the short‐term interest rate.
20 We illustrate this evolu-
tion by comparing in figure 2 the response of the long‐term interest rate
(dashed lines) to the response of an artificial long‐term interest rate ex-
cluding a term premium (crosses). The latter is obtained by appealing
to the expectations hypothesis and is computed as the average response
of the short‐term interest rate over the subsequent 28 quarters, that is, a
theoretical bond of 7‐year maturity. A striking difference between the
full sample and the post‐1999 regime is that, since the launch of the
euro, the response of long‐term interest rates displays a smaller term
premium (i.e., a smaller difference between the market long‐term rate
andtheartificialrate).Theresponsesoftheseinterestratesarerepresented
in the lower right plot of figure 2 for the EA, but they are almost identical
forallindividualcountriesinthepost‐1999period.Moreover,overtheen-
tire sample, the term premium gap is the largest in Italy and in Spain,
which suggests that prior to the launch of the euro, the premium for the
risk of devaluation or depreciation of the peseta and the lira increased
markedly following a tightening of the monetary policy stance in the EA.
While most measures of economic activity appear to fall less in the
EMU period, presumably in part because of smaller bond yield re-
sponses, much of the remaining output adjustment appears to be driven
by international trade. This may be an important feature of the new
Monetary Transmission Mechanism 97monetary policy regime characterized by more stable long‐term interest
rates and a sharper response of the EA‐wide real exchange rate to mone-
tary policy shocks.
Finally, the responses of several variables (some not reported) remain
heterogeneous across countries in the EMU period. To name a few, the
responses of M1 are twice as negative in Spain and Belgium as in France,
Germany, and Italy. M3 increases in all countries, though to a different
extent. Relatively larger responses of German exports and investment
carrythroughtoalargerGDPresponsethaninotherEAcountries.Public
consumption responses range from positive in Belgium and Italy—the
two countries with the largest stock of government debt—to sharply neg-
ative in the Netherlands. We also note some differences in labor market
dynamics, aspects analyzed in depth in McCallum and Smets (2007).
E. Robustness
In view of the small number of degrees of freedom we have available to
estimatethe above set ofresults, wehaveconducted a seriesofrobustness
Fig. 2. Responses of short‐ and long‐term interest rates to monetary shock in EA. First
five subplots represent responses of interest rates in 1998–2007 sample. Bottom‐right plot
contains responses for EMU period. The solid line is the short‐term interest rate, the
dashed line is the bond yield, and the crossed line is the theoretical bond yield without
term premium, based on the expectations hypothesis.
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ticular, we estimated the above impulse response functions with models
thatadmitadditionallags,additionallatentfactors,andquarter‐on‐quarter
growthrates, and we consider shocks to the German interest rate instead
of the EA average interest rate.
Most of the results described above are robust. In particular, the larger
response of the Italian and Spanish interest rates and of their consump-
tion are common outcomes of all these alternative specifications when
estimated over the full sample. Interestingly, Italy and Spain also stand
o u ti nr e s p o n s et oa nu n e x p e c t e do i lp r i c ei n c r e a s e ,w i t hI t a l i a na n d
Spanish bond yields increasing more than in the other countries of the
EA and consumption falling more (see the appendix of the working pa-
per version). This provides further evidence that bond markets and
credibility issues may contribute to the different responses of European
economies to various shocks prior to the EMU.
In all specifications considered, we observe a smaller response of con-
sumption after 1999 than in the full‐sample estimates, following a
monetary tightening. However, the specification with quarter‐on‐quarter
growth rates and several lags shows that, because of a large response of
exports, GDP declines as much in the post‐1999 period as in the full sam-
ple. These impulse response functions, however, are much less precisely
estimated than in our benchmark specification.
In the case in which the monetary policy shock is defined in terms of
the German short‐term interest rate, nearly all the results reported in
figure 1 carry through. As mentioned above, however, the price puzzle
for German CPI is very much attenuated. This reflects that the identi-
fication of area‐wide monetary shocks in the period prior to the euro is
difficult. However, except for the response of German prices, nearly all
other impulse responses are strikingly similar for a German or an area‐
wide monetary policy shock.
V. Explaining the Evolution of the Transmission Mechanism:
The Role of Monetary Regimes and Interest Rate Parity
As discussed in the previous section, the empirical characterization of
the transmission of monetary policy in the EA displays a rich picture. In
the pre‐EMU period, interest rate surprises in Germany or in the EA as
a whole are found to cause larger responses of short‐term rates in Italy
and Spain, relatively large increases in long‐term bond yields, deprecia-
tions of the Italian and Spanish currencies (in both nominal and real
terms), and a sharp contraction in consumption and investment in these
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improvement in net exports, thereby resulting in a moderate contrac-
tion of real GDP. In the EMU period, however, a similar increase in
the EA interest rate results in a much more homogeneous response of
individual EA countries and a quantitatively smaller reduction in eco-
nomic activity measures.
While the European economy has changed in many dimensions since
the monetary union, we now attempt to determine to what extent the
monetary regime in place can explain the differences in the transmission
of monetary policy both across countries and over time. To do so, we use
an open‐economy DSGE monetary model along the lines of Clarida,
Galí, and Gertler (2002), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002, 2005), Altissimo,
Benigno, and Rodriguez‐Palenzuela (2004), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005),
Benigno and Benigno (2006), Ferrero et al. (forthcoming), and others.
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The specific variant considered here builds on the work of Ferrero
e ta l .T h i sf r a m e w o r k ,w h i l es t y l i z e d ,i ss u f f i c i e n t l yr i c ht og e n e r a t ea
nontrivial effect of monetary policy variables such as output, consump-
tion, net exports, and inflation measures. It also allows for different
consumption responses across regions and a switching of expendi-
tures in consumption and net exports in response to real exchange rate
movements.
We proceed by presenting the model. The model is explained in
detail in Ferrero et al. (forthcoming), so we merely summarize it here,
emphasizing the changes relative to their model. We next discuss
the calibration of the model parameters, including those charac-
terizing monetary policy. Finally, we analyze the model’s implica-
tions, attempting to provide an explanation for the stylized facts just
described.
A. A Stylized Two‐Country Model
The model involves two large countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F), of
equal size. Each country is populated by a representative household
that consumes tradable and nontradable goods and contains a contin-
uum of workers who supply labor to intermediate‐goods firms. Each
of these firms hires one worker and produces either tradable or non-
tradable goods that it sells on a monopolistically competitive market.
These firms optimally reset their prices at random time intervals. In
each sector, we also have competitive final‐goods firms that combine
the differentiated intermediate goods into a homogeneous consumption
good. In addition, to fit the evidence on imperfect pass‐through (e.g.,
Boivin, Giannoni, and Mojon 100Campa and Goldberg 2006), we assume as in Monacelli (2005) that
monopolistically competitive importers of foreign tradable goods resell
them to residents at prices set in domestic currency in a staggered fash-
ion.
22 In order to account for different consumption behavior across
countries, we assume incomplete financial markets across countries
(even though the household provides perfect insurance within each
country) by assuming that a single bond is traded internationally.
As in Ferrero et al. (forthcoming), one simplification is that we treat
as nondurable consumption all domestic interest rate sensitive ex-
penditures, including what is commonly labeled as investment. How-
ever, as mentioned in Woodford (2003, chap. 5), to the extent that we
are not interested in distinguishing consumption and investment, this
s h o u l dn o ta f f e c ti m p o r t a n t l yt h em o d e l ’s predictions for the other
variables.
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We will consider two monetary regimes. The pre‐EMU regime is
characterized by distinct central banks in each country, each setting
short‐term interest rates according to a generalized Taylor rule that
may include responses to exchange rate fluctuations. Area‐wide variables
are obtained by aggregating the relevant variables across the two coun-
tries. In the post‐EMU regime, instead, a supranational authority—the
ECB—is assumed to set an EA‐wide interest rate according to a general-
ized Taylor rule involving area‐wide variables.
In order for the model to be consistent with the identifying assump-
tions made in our empirical FAVAR to identify the monetary policy
shocks, we assume in contrast to Ferrero et al. (forthcoming) but simi-
larly to Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Christiano et al. (2005)
that the households’ aggregate consumption decisions and all firms’
pricing decisions are made prior to the realization of exogenous shocks,
so that prices and consumption do not respond contemporaneously to
the monetary shock. In addition, we allow households to form habits in
consumption and the firms that do not reoptimize their prices to index
them to past inflation. Such deviations from Ferrero et al.’s model al-
low the model to generate responses of consumption and inflation to
shocks that are more in line with the FAVAR estimates.
As a last departure from Ferrero et al., we allow for a wedge in the
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition. This wedge, assumed to
be exogenous here, is meant to capture deviations from the UIP, argued
byDevereux and Engel (2002) tobeneeded inorder toexplainthe discon-
nect between fluctuations in exchange rates and other macroeconomic
variables. Empirical evidence for such deviations from UIP have also
often been reported in the empirical literature, whether unconditionally
Monetary Transmission Mechanism 101(e.g.,FrootandThaler1990;BekaertandHodrick1993;Engel1996;Mark
and Wu 1998; Rossi 2007) or conditionally on monetary policy shocks
(Eichenbaum and Evans 1995; Scholl and Uhlig 2008). While Bekaert,
Wei, and Xing (2007) find smaller departures from the UIP than reported
previously, when adjusting for small‐sample bias, they find evidence
of a time‐v a r y i n gr i s kp r e m i u md i s p l a y i n gah i g h l yp e r s i s t e n tc o m p o -
nent in expected exchange rate changes. As discussed below, such
a wedge will prove to be important in explaining the differential re-
sponses of consumption and investment across countries in the pre‐
EMU period.
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whereEt 1 istheexpectation operator,conditional ontheinformation up
totheendofperiodt   1;Ct denotesaggregateconsumption;ω ∈ð0;1 is
the degreeofinternal habitpersistence; σ 1 > 0wouldcorrespondtothe
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in the absence of habit forma-
tion; φ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply; and Lktðf Þ
represents hours worked by worker f ∈½0;1  in an intermediate‐goods
firm,insectork,thatis,eitherthehometradablesectorH(withmeasureγ)
or the domestic nontradable sector N (with measure 1   γ). As in Ferrero
et al. (forthcoming), the discount factor  t evolvesaccording to t ¼ βt t 1
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Boivin, Giannoni, and Mojon 102with γ∈ ½0;1  representing the share of tradable goods. The consump-
tion of tradable goods combines in turn home‐produced goods CHt and
foreign‐produced goods CFt as follows:
CTt ≡½α1=ηðCHtÞ




The coefficient α ∈ð0:5;1  denotes home bias in tradables, and η is the
elasticity of substitution among domestically produced and imported
tradables. The home CPI, which minimizes the cost of consumer expen-
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aggregates, and price indices, which we denote by starred (





assume that householdschoose theirlevel oftotal consumptiononthe ba-
sisofinformationavailableatdatet   1,welet themchoose the allocation
of their consumption basket after the contemporaneous shocks have been
realized. The optimal allocation of (domestically and foreign‐produced)
























tionally traded one‐period bond. We denote by Bt the nominal holdings at
the beginning of period t þ 1, denominated in units of the home currency.
The household’s budget constraint in the home country is then given by







WNtð fÞLNtðfÞdf þ ϒt; ð7Þ
where It 1 isthe gross nominal interest rate in domestic currency between
periods t   1a n dt, WktðfÞ is the nominal wage obtained by worker f in
Monetary Transmission Mechanism 103sector k,a n dϒt combines aggregate dividends, lump‐sum taxes, and
transfers.Maximizingtheutilityfunction(4)subjectto(7)yieldsthefol-
l o w i n go p t i m a lc h o i c eo fe x p e n d i t u r e s :
Et 1fΛtPtg¼Et 1fðCt   ωCt 1Þ
 σ   ωβtðCtþ1   ωCtÞ
 σg; ð8Þ
where Λt is the household’s marginal utility of additional nominal in-
come at date t. This expression makes clear that the plan for aggregate
consumption at date t is made on the basis of information available at









Furthermore, the optimal choice of labor supply equalizes the real
wage with the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure.
The representative household in the foreign country is very similar.
One difference, however, between the two countries is that the foreign
bond is not traded internationally. The foreign household’s budget con-
straint, expressed in units of the foreign currency, is then
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t; ð10Þ
wherethelaborincomeindicatesthatforeignworkersandfirmsoperatein
either the foreign tradable sector or the nontradable sector; D 
t represents
the foreign household’s holdings of the foreign debt; B 
t denotes the for-
eign household’s holdings of the domestic bond, issued in the home cur-
rency; and Et is the nominal exchange rate, that is, the amount of home
currency needed in exchange for a unit of foreign currency. In contrast
to Ferrero et al. (forthcoming) but as in McCallum and Nelson (2000) or
Justiniano and Preston (2006), we introduce an exogenous term eμt 1 that
can be interpreted as a risk premium shock or a bias in the foreign house-
hold’s expectation of the period t revenue from holding home bonds.
This shock can alternatively be interpreted as a bias in the foreign house-
hold’s date t   1 forecast of the date t exchange rate, Et, as in Kollmann
(2002).
The foreign household's choice of consumption plans is also charac-
terized by optimal conditions of the form (8) and (9). In addition, given
Boivin, Giannoni, and Mojon 104that foreign citizens may hold bonds of both countries, they must be
indifferent between holding home and foreign bonds. This results in
























We have three types of firms: final‐goods firms, intermediate‐goods
firms, and importing retailers.
Final‐goods firms. In each sector H and N, final‐goods firms, which are
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where  >1 is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods.
Cost minimization for the final‐goods firms implies the following de-
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where the price indices PHt and PNt aggregate underlying prices PktðfÞ.
Each intermediate firm f in sector k ¼ H;N produces output Yktðf Þ by
hiring labor Lktð fÞ and using the production function
YktðfÞ¼AtLktðfÞ;
where the total factor productivity term At ¼ Zteat, Zt=Zt 1 ¼ 1 þ g de-
scribes trend productivity, and eat denotes temporary fluctuations in to-
tal factor productivity. As the firm competes to attract labor, its nominal
marginal cost is MCktðfÞ¼WktðfÞ=At.
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staggered manner. A fraction 1   ξ of firms (chosen independently of
the history of price changes) can choose a new price in each period. Our
informational assumptions imply that the firms that get to reset their
prices must do so using information available at period t   1. In addition,
we assume that if a price is not reoptimized, it is indexed to lagged infla-
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subject to the demand for their good (12). In the previous expression,
Λt;tþs ¼ βt;tþsΛtþs=Λt is the stochastic discount factor between periods t
and t þ s, βt;tþs ¼ Πs 1
j¼0βtþj for s≥1, and βt;t ¼ 1.
The price index then satisfies
Pkt ¼
 
ð1   ξÞðPo
ktÞ






 δ 1   1=ð1  Þ
:
Importing retailers. To model the imperfect pass‐through found in the
data, we assume that monopolistically competitive retailers import for-
eigntradablegoodsandsellthemtodomesticconsumers,asinMonacelli
(2005). These retailers also set their prices in a staggered fashion so that
the law of one price does not hold at the consumer level. As for the inter-
mediate firms, a fraction 1   ~ ξ of retailers choose a new price in each pe-
riod on the basisof information available atperiod t   1. Again, if aprice
is not reoptimized, it is indexed to lagged inflation in that sector, accord-
ing to the rule (13). Since the problem is identical for retailers that reset
their price at date t, they all choose an optimal price Po




















Boivin, Giannoni, and Mojon 106subject to the demand for the imported good (6). In the above expres-
sion, P 
F;t denotes the price of foreign tradable goods in a foreign cur-
rency. The price index of imported goods in the domestic currency
satisfies













We consider two distinct monetary regimes, one referring to the pre‐
EMUperiod,inwhicheachnationalcentralbanksetsitsowninterestrate
according to a generalized forward‐looking Taylor rule, and one refer-
ring to the monetary union, in which a supranational central bank sets
common short‐term interest rates.
More specifically, in the pre‐EMU regime, we assume that the home
national central bank sets its short‐term riskless interest rate according
to
it ¼ ρit 1 þð 1   ρÞðϕπEt
‐ πtþh þ ϕyyt þ ϕii 
t þ ϕeΔetÞþεt; ð14Þ
where it ≡ logðIt=IÞ corresponds to the deviations of the interest rate
from its steady‐state value, ‐ πt ≡ logðPt=Pt 4Þ denotes deviations of yoy
CPI inflation around the steady state (assumed to be zero), yt represents
percent deviations of output from trend, Δet ¼ logðEt=Et 1Þ denotes
percent nominal depreciation of the home currency, and the indepen-
dently and identically distributed shock εt measures unexpected inter-
est rate disturbances. The foreign central bank follows a similar rule:
i 
t ¼ ρ i 
t 1 þð 1   ρ Þðϕ 
πEt ‐ π 
tþh  þ ϕ 
yy 
t þ ϕ 
i it þ ϕ 
eΔetÞþε 
t; ð15Þ
where, again, the asterisks refer to foreign variables or coefficients.
Note that we allow for cross‐country interactions since the national
central banks may respond to fluctuations in the exchange rate or to
the other country’s interest rate. Clarida et al. (1998) and Angeloni and
Dedola (1999) argue that such rules provide a good characterization of
monetary policy in a number of countries, including Germany and
Italy, before the monetary union.
In the EMU regime, a single common short‐term rate prevails, so that
it ¼ i 
t ¼ iea
t , where ea stands for euro area variables, and Δet ¼ 0 in all
Monetary Transmission Mechanism 107periods. We assume that the common central bank—corresponding to
the ECB—sets interest rates according to the interest rate rule
iea
t ¼ ρeaiea
t 1 þð 1   ρeaÞðϕea





where area‐wide inflation and output are defined as ‐ πea
t ¼ð‐ πt þ ‐ π 
tÞ=2
and yea
t ¼ð yt þ y 
tÞ=2.
4. Equilibrium Characterization
To close the model, we use equilibrium conditions stating that the sup-
ply of tradable and nontradable goods must be equal to the respective
demands in each country and that international financial markets clear.
To characterize theresponseof various variables to monetary shocks, we
solve a log‐linear approximation to the model’s equilibrium conditions
around a deterministicstate, using standard techniques. We thus implic-
itly assume that the shocks are small enough for the approximation to be
valid.Inthesteadystate,botheconomiesaresymmetric;thetradebalance
and foreign debt are equal to zero; output in each sector grows at the con-
stant trend productivity growth rate g; the relative prices of all goods, in-
cluding the real exchange rate Qt ≡ EtP 
t=Pt, are equal to one; inflation is
equaltozero;andtherealinterest rateisequaltoð1 þ gÞ=β,wh er eβisthe
steady‐state value of βt.
The log‐linearized equilibrium conditions are described in the appen-
dix of the working paper version.
B. Model Calibration
We calibrate the model’s parameters in order to provide its quantitative
predictions and to determine whether we can replicate at least some of
the stylized facts mentioned above. In particular, we focus our attention
on changes in responses of key macroeconomic variables between the
pre‐EMU and EMU periods. We also focus on the difference in responses
across countries in the pre‐EMU period, especially the differences be-
tween Italy and Spain on the one hand and Germany along with other
EA countries on the other hand. We assume that Home (H) stands for
Italy or Spain and Foreign (F) stands for Germany along with the other
EA countries.
We calibrate the structural parameters describing the behavior of the
private sector similarly to earlier studies such as Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2005) or Ferrero et al. (forthcoming) and use estimated coefficients
for the policy rules. While the calibration of the structural parameters
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sponses, we did check that the model’s predictions are not too sensitive
to the chosen parameter values. However, as we will see below, coeffi-
cients of the policy rules do play an important role in the shape of the
responses to various shocks.
1. Structural Parameters
As mentioned, most structural parameters are taken from Ferrero et al.
(forthcoming) and are roughly in line with values chosen in other stud-
ies (e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff 2005) and with some microeconomic data.
We set the same values for both countries. The steady‐state growth rate
of the economy g is set to 0.5%, so that annual growth is 2%. The steady‐
state discount factor β is set to 0.99. The parameters describing the evolu-
tion of the discount factor ϑ ¼  1;000 and ψ ¼ 7:2361   10 6 are chosen
so that fluctuations in βt have no noticeable implications on the econ-
omy dynamics.
26 The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is φ 1 ¼ 0:5. The
elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods   ¼ 11 results in a
steady‐state markup of 10% in the tradable and nontradable sectors. We
set the probability that intermediate‐goods firms and importing retailers
do not reoptimize their price to ξ ¼ ~ ξ ¼ 0:66, corresponding to a mean
duration between price reoptimizations of 3 quarters. Smets and Wouters
(2002) find evidence that import prices display a degree of price sticki-
ness similar to that of domestic prices on the basis of estimated responses
to monetary shocks in the EA. For the parameters that determine the
openness of the economies, we set the share of tradables in the con-
sumption basket γ to 0.25, the preference share for home tradables α ¼
0:7 (it would be 0.5 in the absence of home bias), and the elasticity of
substitution between home and foreign tradables is η ¼ 2, as in Ferrero
et al.
Ferrero et al. assume a log utility function of consumption and no
habit persistence or inflation indexing. However, this yields sharp re-
sponses in inflation and consumption to monetary shocks, in contrast
to the empirical evidence. To generate more realistic hump‐shaped re-
sponses of consumption expenditures and output of the model econ-
omy, we assume some degree of habit persistence ω.
27 We calibrate this
parameterat0.59,whichcorrespondstothe(median)estimateobtained
by Smets and Wouters (2003) in their model of the EA. We similarly use
their estimates to calibrate the curvature of the utility of consump-
tion and the degree of inflation indexing to, respectively, σ ¼ 1:37 and
δ ¼ ~ δ ¼ 0:47.
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We calibrate the policy rule coefficients for the home and foreign
countries in the pre‐EMU period using estimates of Angeloni and
Dedola (1999, table 9b). These authors estimate interest rate rules of the
form (14)–( 1 5 )j o i n t l yf o rI t a l ya n dG e r m a n y ,f o rt h ep e r i o d1 9 8 8 –97,
which covers nearly entirely our pre‐EMU sample. Their preferred spec-
ification involves horizons on inflation expectations of h ¼ h  ¼ 0, so
that the central banks set interest rates in response to inflation that has
occurred over the past year. As the estimates are obtained using monthly
data, we convert them for application to quarterly data.
28 We thus have
ρ ¼ 0:79, ϕπ ¼ 1:22, ϕy ¼ 0:30, and ϕi ¼ 0:41 for Italy
29 and ρ  ¼ 0:82,
ϕ 
π ¼ 1:41, ϕ 
y ¼ 0:30, and ϕ 
i ¼ 0 for Germany. Angeloni and Dedola do
not include a bilateral deutsche mark/lira exchange rate in their policy
rules, but they include the dollar/deutsche mark exchange rate. Since
we abstract from the world outside of the EA in the model, we assume
that German monetary policy does not respond to the exchange rate
(ϕ 
e ¼ 0), whereas the annualized Italian interest rate responds with a
short‐run coefficient of 0.4 to the exchange rate depreciation. This is
meant to capture the fact that the Italian central bank was required to
maintain its exchange rate within narrow bands, as long as it took part
in the exchange rate mechanism. This results in a long‐run coefficient
ϕe ¼ 5.
For the post‐EMU period, we estimate an interest rate rule of the
form (16) on EA data, using generalized method of moments, similarly
to Clarida et al. (1998). We use as instruments the current value of infla-
tion and detrended output as well as three latent factors extracted from
the EA indicators. Our preferred horizon is h ¼ 2. As the estimated
coefficient on the lagged interest rate is relatively high, ρea ¼ 0:93, the im-
plied long‐run responses to expected inflation and output fluctua-
tions are also quite strong: ϕea
π ¼ 13:03 and ϕea
y ¼ 8:01.
30 Nonetheless,
we verify that our conclusions remain robust to smaller values of these
coefficients.
3. Wedge in Uncovered Interest Rate Parity
The remaining parameters that we need to calibrate refer to the process
describing the wedge in the uncovered interest rate parity, μt. The UIP
condition (11) can be log‐linearized to yield
it   i 
t ¼ EtΔetþ1 þ μt: ð17Þ
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to monetary shocks
μt ¼ ρμμt 1 þ νε 
t þ εμt;
where ε 
t are foreign monetary policy shocks and εμt denotes other pos-
sible shocks to that wedge. By allowing μt to respond to monetary
shocks, we hope to capture in an arguably reduced form the effect of
monetary shocks on the risk premium emphasized by Scholl and Uhlig
(2008). We assume that this wedge is very persistent, setting ρμ ¼ 0:98,
and will consider different values of the parameter ν.
C. The Model’s Quantitative Predictions: Explaining the Changes
in the Monetary Transmission Mechanism
Having calibrated the model, we can now determine whether it can rep-
licate the stylized facts mentioned above, namely, the cross‐country dif-
ferences in responses as well as their changes with the introduction of
the euro that we report in figures 1a–1c.
1. Pre‐EMU Cross‐Country Differences
Figures 3a–3d indicate the responses of key variables to an unexpected
interest rate increase of 100 basis points in the foreign economy—which
stands for Germany—i nt h ec a s ei nw h i c hb o t he c o n o m i e ss e tt h e i ri n -
terest rates according to the estimated policy rules (14) and (15). This is
meant to replicate the effects of a monetary policy tightening in the pre‐
EMU period, reported in figures 1a–1c.
Figure 3a shows the responses of the home economy (i.e., Italy or
Spain, solid lines) and the foreign economy (i.e., Germany, dashed lines)
in the absence of a wedge in the UIP condition (ν ¼ 0, so μt ¼ 0). The un-
expectedincreaseintheforeignshort‐termrateisassociatedwitharisein
the long‐term rate and a drop in output, consumption, and inflation. As
the domestic currency depreciates more than prices adjust, the domestic
real exchange rate (qt) also depreciates, and home terms of trade (TOT,
measuring foreign prices relative to domestic prices, in domestic cur-
rency)increase.Thisstimulatesanincreaseinnetexportsofhomegoods.
Note that investors in the internationally traded security do not require
as large an increase in the home interest rate as that observed for the for-
eign interest rate. The reason is that the domestic currency is expected to
have depreciated beyond its long‐term value, so that it is expected to ap-
preciate slightly in subsequent periods.
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with the interest rate responses that we had documented for countries
such as Spain and Italy in figure 1a. In fact, in pre‐EMU data, these short‐
and long‐term rates increased significantly more than those estimated
for Germany and other countries. They were also associated with sharp
contractions in consumption and employment in those countries. In-
stead, the model‐based responses display a milder response of the home
variables. One might think that by letting the home country’sc e n t r a l
bank respond more to exchange rate fluctuations (i.e., a larger ϕe), we
may generate stronger responses of interest rates and consumption at
home. However, even for very large values of ϕe, we cannot produce
larger responses of the home interest rate, output, and consumption
than in the foreign economy. As shown in figure 3c, in the limit, as
ϕe → þ1, the nominal exchange rate is perfectly stabilized, and the
Fig. 3a. Model‐based responses to a 100 basis point monetary tightening in a foreign
country (pre‐EMU, ν ¼ 0).
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spond to those of a single closed economy.
31 In addition, changes in
structural parameters do not generically modify the picture presented.
The basic version of the model cannot replicate the transmission of
monetary policy observed in low‐credibility regimes since long‐term
rates are tightly tied to expected future riskless short‐term rates. One
key parameter, however, that allows us to deviate from the standard
case and seems to explain the stylized facts reported in figures 1a–1c is
ν. Figure 3b reports the model‐based responses of the same variables in
the case ν ¼ 0:6. In that case, an unexpected increasein the foreign short‐
term rate triggers a much larger increase in the home interest rate—as
observed in the data—since the wedge μt suddenly rises in response
to an interest rate increase in the foreign country. This wedge suggests
that in response to the foreign monetary shock, international investors
Fig. 3b. Model‐based responses to a 100 basis point monetary tightening in a foreign
country (pre‐EMU, ν ¼ 0:6).
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they do on foreign securities, even after accounting for the rational ex-
pectation of nominal exchange rate changes.
Such an exchange rate risk premium appears important to explain
the stylized facts reported above. In fact, in figure 3b, not only do short‐
and long‐term rates respond more strongly at home than in the foreign
country, but these interest rate responses also generate a larger drop in
the home country consumption. As in the data, output falls less than
consumption because home country net exports increase. Note also
that while monetary policy reduces activity in both regions, prices do
increase in the home country as a result of the currency depreciation.
Fig. 3c. Model‐based responses to a 100 basis point monetary tightening in a common
area (monetary union case, ν ¼ 0:6).
Boivin, Giannoni, and Mojon 114Interestingly, prices aggregated for both regions (dashed‐dotted line)
can also increase following the monetary tightening, to the extent that
inflation in the depreciating country more than offsets the inflation re-
duction in the other region. This can explain an apparent “price puzzle”
in the home country or in the area as a whole in response to monetary
tightening.
TheexercisejustperformedthussuggeststhatconditionalonEA‐wide
(or German) monetary shocks, changes in the risk premium on Italian
and Spanish securities may provide an important explanation for the
large observed responses in bond yields and the fact that consumption
and investment used to fall considerably more in those countries than in
the rest of the EA.
2. Monetary Union and Changes in the Monetary Transmission
Mechanism
By adopting the euro as their currency, all EMU countries essentially
eliminated exchange rate risks relative to the other member countries.
Figure 3c r e p o r t st h er e s p o n s e so ft h es a m ev a r i a b l e si nt h ec a s eo fa
Fig. 3d. Model‐based responses of aggregate EAvariables to a 100 basis point monetary
tightening in a foreign economy (solid lines: ν ¼ 0; dashed lines: ν ¼ 0:6).
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estimated rule (16). Sinceboth countries are symmetricin the calibration,
they both respond identically to the EA interest rate shock.
Comparing figures 3a–3b on one hand with figure 3c on the other
hand reveals important differences in the responses to an unexpected
increase in the interest rate set by the foreign central bank in the pre‐
EMU regime and the common central bank in the EMU regime. The
model predicts that the home economy benefits in many respects from
participating to the monetary union in response to such a shock. In par-
ticular, when we remove exchange rate risks in the EMU regime, home
(short‐ and long‐term) interest rates increase by less, as we observed in
the empirical responses. As a result, home consumption falls by less
and output remains more stable.
According to the model, removing exchange rate risks may have
helped stabilize not only countries such as Italy and Spain but also
the entire EA. To isolate the effect of the exchange rate risk, we report
in figure 3d the model‐based responses of the EA variables obtained
by aggregating the home and foreign responses, following a monetary
Fig. 3e. Model‐based responses of EAvariables to a 100 basis point monetary tightening
in the EA under alternative policy rules (solid lines: ECB policy rule; dashed lines:
Bundesbank policy rule).
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short‐ and long‐term interest rates, output, consumption, and inflation
are all more muted when we remove the risk premium shock μt.
The EMU has not only contributed to smaller responses by removing
exchange rate risks. The model predicts that a monetary policy that has
more consistently aimed at stabilizing inflation and output in the EA,
since the start of the EMU, should result in a smaller observed response
of aggregate economic activity and inflation to monetary shocks, as ob-
served in the data. To illustrate this, figure 3e shows the model‐based
responses of EAvariables to a monetary tightening (of 100 basis points)
assuming two different policy rules: the one estimated for the ECB (solid
lines) and the one estimated previously (by Angeloni and Dedola [1999])
for the Bundesbank (dashed lines). The figure indicates that stronger re-
sponses by the ECB to inflation and output fluctuations, essentially
stemming from a very inertial rule, have resulted in smaller responses
of economic activity and inflation. It is important to stress, however, that
the smaller response of output and inflation is not due to the fact that the
economy is less sensitive to monetary policy. All elasticities describing
the behavior of the private sector, such as the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution and so on, are maintained constant in this experiment. It is
only the stronger commitment to inflation and output stabilization that
results in such an outcome.
32
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided an empirical characterization of the
monetary transmission mechanism in key European economies, ex-
ploiting the richness of the cross‐country differences and the fact that a
majorchangeinmonetaryregimehasoccurredin1999withtheadoption
ofthe euro by 11Europeancountries.The combinationofthe cross‐country
heterogeneity and the changes over time provides a unique laboratory
for the analysis of numerous macroeconomic indicators.
Focusing on six major European economies, we have argued that a
large fraction of the fluctuations in these economic variables can be cap-
tured by a low‐dimensional vector of common components. This find-
ing is useful to the extent that it allows us to characterize the effects of
monetary shocks on all variables of interest, despite the fact that we
have extremely short samples with a relatively stable regime.
Looking at the EA as a whole, in the 1988–2007 sample, we have
found that the responses of key macroeconomic variables to monetary
disturbances conceal important heterogeneity across countries. Such
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we allow for a disturbance in the uncovered interest rate parity condi-
tion, which may be interpreted as a risk premium shock. In addition,
despite the short samples, we have detected preliminary evidence of
important changes in the transmission of monetary policy since the
start of the EMU.
We have argued that some of the changes since 1999 can be explained
by the change in the monetary regime. In particular, our model predicts
that when an exchange rate risk has been removed through the mone-
tary union and there is a central bank that is more decisively focused on
inflation and output stabilization, the impact of monetary disturbances
on measures of economic activity has been reduced, as observed in the
data. While private consumption and investment in Italy and Spain ap-
pear to have been especially hard hit by German monetary policy dis-
turbances in the pre‐EMU period, the new monetary regime has
contributed to stabilizing them more effectively, in part because long‐
t e r mi n t e r e s tr a t e sh a v eb e c o m em u c hm o r ee f f e c t i v e l ya n c h o r e di n
such countries since the start of the monetary union.
We have also found that the exchange rate channel has become rel-
atively more powerful in the monetary union period than in the pre-
vious decade and that national monetary aggregates appear much
less driven by EA common shocks and show more heterogeneous re-




The data were extracted from Haver Analytics, and their source is
either the OECD Main Economic Indicators or OECD Quarterly Na-
tional Accounts databases. The sources for monetary aggregates are
the national central banks for their respective countries and the ECB
for the EA. The national accounts published in Haver are available start-
ing at different dates: 1978 in France, 1981 in Italy, 1988 in the Nether-
lands, 1991 in Germany, 1995 in Spain and Belgium, and 1995 for some
deflators in the EA. Missing data were backdated using yoy growth
rates of an earlier vintage of OECD and ECB databases. Table A1 in
the appendix of the working paper version gives a full account of the
data used.
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1. At that date, the conversion rates of the national currencies of the Eurozone were
fixed irrevocably, and a 3‐year transition period started until the introduction of the euro
banknotes and coins in January 2002. Since then other countries such as Greece, Slovenia,
Malta, and Cyprus have adopted the euro.
2. We refer to the EMU as stage III of the European Monetary Union, which involves
the launch of the euro in January 1999.
3. As long as a sufficient number of unobserved factors are included, the inclusion of
oil price inflation as an observable factor should not affect our results. It does, however,
allow us to identify oil price shocks and document their effects. We report such results in
the appendix of the working paper version of this paper.
4. In fact, Stock and Watson (1999) refer to (2) as a dynamic factor model.
5. While alternative strategies to the estimation of factor models with a large set of
indicators exist (see, among others, Forni et al. 2000; Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman 2003;
Bernanke et al. 2005; Boivin and Giannoni 2006a; Doz, Giannone, and Reichlin 2007), the
evidence suggests that they perform similarly in practice.
6. In contrast to the approach adopted here, Bernanke et al. do not impose the con-
straint that the observed factors are among the common components in the first step.
They instead remove these observed factors from the space covered by the principal com-
ponents by peforming a transformation of the principal components exploiting the differ-
ent behavior of what they call “slow‐moving” and “fast‐moving” variables in the second
step. Our approach herefollows Boivin and Giannoni (forthcoming) and Boivin, Giannoni,
and Mihov (forthcoming).
7. More specifically, we adopt the following procedure in the first step of the estimation.
Starting from an initial estimate of Ft, denoted by F
ð0Þ
t and obtained as the first K principal
components of Xt, we iterate through the following steps: (1) we regress Xt on F
ð0Þ
t and
the observed factors Yt ¼½ πoil
t ;Rt ′ to obtain ^ λ
ð0Þ
Y ;( 2 )w ec o m p u t e~ X
ð0Þ
t ¼ Xt   ^ λ′
ð0Þ
Y Yt;
(3) we estimate F
ð1Þ
t as the first K principal components of ~ X
ð0Þ
t ; (4) we repeat steps (1)–(3)
multiple times.
8. Note that this two‐step approach implies the presence of “generated regressors” in
the second step. According to the results of Bai (2003), the uncertainty in the factor esti-
mates should be negligible when N is large relative to T. Still, the confidence intervals on
the impulse response functions used below are based on a bootstrap procedure that ac-
counts for the uncertainty in the factor estimation. As in Bernanke et al. (2005), the boot-
strap procedure is such that (1) the factors can be resampled on the basis of the observation
equation, and (2) conditionalon the estimated factors, theVAR coefficients in thetransition
equation are bootstrapped as in Kilian (1998).
9. For a formal description of the link between the solution of a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model in state space form and a VAR, see, e.g., Sims
(2000) and Fernández‐Villaverde et al. (2007). Boivin and Giannoni (2006a) establish for-
mally the link between DSGE models and the FAVAR representation (1)–(2) in the context
of a data‐rich environment.
10. The estimation of aggregate models for the EA has a relatively short history since
there did not exist sufficiently long historical time series of consistent EA national ac-
counts before the launch of the euro and the publication of Fagan et al. (2005). National
accounts for the EA, published by Eurostat, start only in 1995.
Monetary Transmission Mechanism 11911. Van Els et al. (2003) show that spillovers across countries tend to reinforce the effects
of monetary policy on output and on prices. See also Fagan and Morgan (2006).
12. Boivin and Giannoni (2006a) argue, e.g., that inflation is imperfectly measured by any
single indicator and that it is important to use multiple indicators of it for proper inference.
13. Major steps in this process include the start of the EMS in 1979, the entrance of Spain
andPortugalintotheEMS in1986,thepost‐reunification exchangeratecrisisof 1992–93, and
the announcement of the parities between national currencies and the euro in May 1997.
14. For instance, Kose et al. (2003) and Stock and Watson (2005) study the comovement
of output, consumption, and investment for a large panel of countries and for Group of
7 countries, respectively. Giannone and Reichlin (2006) analyze the comovement of output
across EA countries. In addition, the ECB is carefully monitoring real and nominal hetero-
geneity across countries (Benalal et al. 2006).
15. Camacho, Péréz‐Quirós, and Saiz (2006) argue, however, that the EA business cycle
largely reflects the world business cycle.
16. Among the reponses not reported in the figures, the growth rate of M1 also falls,
and the stock market drops by 10% on impact. Public consumption, however, remains
unchanged for about a year and starts falling only after that.
17. The responses of the variables in Belgium and the Netherlands (not reported) are
very similar to those of the EA and countries such as Germany and France but different
from the responses in Italy and Spain. The responses of Belgium and the Netherlands are
available from the authors on request.
18. Recall that the variables in the FAVAR are expressed in yoy growth rates. The im-
pulse response functions of yoy growth rates and (log) levels are identical for the first four
quarters following the shock.
19. The real exchange rate response is larger for the EA than for each of the individual
countries since much of the trade of the individual countries is with other European
economies, whereas the EA real exchange rate measures appreciations and depreciations
solely relative to countries outside of the EA.
20. This result is consistent with those of Ehrmann et al. (2007), who use daily interest
rates to compare the responses of French, German, Italian, and Spanish long‐term yields
to news in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain before and after 1999.
21. For a larger‐scale model, see, e.g., Faruquee et al. (2007).
22. Corsetti and Dedola (2005) propose an alternative model of limited pass‐through in
which distributing imported goods requires nontradables.
23. In fact, macroeconomic models that successfully explain the behavior of investment
often assume adjustment costs in investment (e.g., Basu and Kimball 2003; Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005). As shown in Woodford (2003), such adjustment costs yield
a log‐linearized Euler equation for investment that is very similar to the one for consump-
tion in the presence of internal habit formation. It follows that the intertemporal alloca-
tion of aggregate expenditures can be approximated by a similar Euler equation in which
the degree of habit formation also serves as a proxy for investment adjustment costs.
Nonetheless, in treating investment similarly to nondurable expenditures, we do abstract
from the effects of investment on future production capacities.
24. This formulation of the discount factor incorporates—in the case in which the rep-
resentative household stands for a continuum of households—the stimulative effect on
individual consumption of an increase in average consumption, as in Uzawa (1968).
However, as emphasized in Ferrero et al. (forthcoming), the parameter ψ is calibrated
to such a small value that this effect is negligible. It merely serves as a technical device
to guarantee a unique steady state in the case of incomplete financial markets across
countries. One can alternatively obtain such a unique steady state by assuming a constant
discount factor β but introducing a debt‐elastic interest rate premium in the budget con-
straints (7) and (10) below, as in Benigno (2001), Kollmann (2002), Schmitt‐Grohe and
Uribe (2003), and Justiniano and Preston (2006).
25. One notable difference with respect to the home economy is that the foreign house-
hold consumption of tradable goods has the form
C
 
Tt ≡ ½ð1   αÞ
1=ηðCHtÞ
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nical device yielding a unique steady state.
27. The degree of habit persistence also proxies for investment adjustment costs in the
case in which consumption expenditures include also investment expenditures.
28. For the conversion,we assume thatmonthly values of (annualized) short‐term interest
rates are constant in a given quarter and equal to the corresponding (annualized) quarterly
rate. In that case, the coefficient on the quarterly lagged interest rate is ρ ¼ ρm=ð3   2ρmÞ,
where ρm is the policy coefficient on the monthly lagged interest rate. The long‐run coeffi-
cients on inflation, output, and the foreign interest rate remain unchanged at the quarterly
frequency.
29. Angeloni and Dedola's (1999) estimated policy rule for Spain is similar to that es-
timated for Italy.
30. While this representation of thepolicy rule appears very aggressive, it isimportant to
realizethatthisisduetothelargecoefficientonthelaggedinterestrate.Thepolicyrulemay
equivalently be written in terms of changes in the interest rate: Δiea
t ¼ 0:91Et ‐ πea
tþ2 þ
0:56yea
t   0:07iea
t 1 þ εea
t .
31. Recall that our calibration is such that apart from the policy rules, the home and
foreign economies are perfectly symmetric.
32. Boivin and Giannoni (2006b) argue that a stronger commitment to inflation stabiliza-
tion in U.S. monetary policy since the early 1980s can similarly explain the observed reduc-
tion in estimated responses of inflation and output in the U.S. economy in the post‐1980
period.
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